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Allan M. Brandt 
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and index. $19.95. 
David Rosner and Gerald Markowitz, eds. Dyingfor Work:  Workers'  Safety  and 
Health  in Twentieth-Century  America.  Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1987. xx +  234. Notes,  tables, selected bibliography, and index. $35.00. 
In 1943, noted industrial health expert, Dr. Alice Hamilton, published a mem- 
oir, Exploring  the  Dangerous  Trades.  Hamilton had spent her professional career 
fearlessly documenting the nature of dangerous industrial chemicals and tox- 
ins, working tirelessly to have them removed from the workplace. A founder 
of the field of industrial hygiene, Hamilton recognized the serious toll taken 
on health by working conditions in factories and mines.1 
Martin  Cherniack's The  Hawk's  Nest Incident,  and David Rosner and Gerald 
Markowitz's Dyingfor  Work  seek to explore the history of the dangerous trades 
in modern America. Both suggest that health and disease are critical  markers 
for understanding the nature of work. The "new" labor history of the 1960s 
and 1970s sought to move beyond traditional historical accounts of trade un- 
ionism to reflect the sociocultural "world of the worker." Nevertheless,  few 
works in this genre explicitly directed attention to the considerable dangers 
of work which laborers  endured. Moreover, few studies attempted to describe 
precisely the toll in disease and debility taken by industrial labor. These two 
fine books break new ground in historical attempts to understand the rela- 
tionship of class, work, and disease. Although many historians have focused 
attention on fights concerning hours and wages, these accounts direct atten- 
tion to the debates about working conditions and safety. In this respect, these 
books take on a critical  yet relatively unexplored dimension of labor history, 
as well as the history of public policy and medicine. 
Martin Cherniack's account of the industrial disaster at Gauley Bridge, 
West Virginia in 1930 is thoroughly researched and closely rendered. Cher- 
niack's narrative  is a model of prospective expose. Although the story of the 
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tragedy at Gauley Bridge has been told before, Cherniack's is the definitive 
account. 
The New Kanawha Power company, a subsidiary of Union Carbide, drilled 
the Hawk's Nest Tunnel in 1930 and 1931 to divert the New River to provide 
hydroelectric  power for a steel alloy production plant. At the time, the thirty- 
foot wide,  three-mile long tunnel was widely noted as a miracle of modern 
engineering-the  ability to move mountains in the name of progress. What 
was not immediately recognized, however, was the tragic  toll that the project 
had exacted in human lives and health. 
In order to conduct the project, Union Carbide  built camps for workers and 
sought to attract  itinerent laborers  to Gauley Bridge. They provided room and 
board to workers for one-half of their weekly salaries. An estimated 2,000 men 
worked ten-hour shifts, six days per week.  Given the nature of the work, 
there was frequent turnover of workers. At any time, 500 men were under- 
ground, with 35 at the drilling face. Blacks  and whites were segregated; blacks 
did the more dangerous work. Working conditions in the tunnel posed great 
risk for the workers. Ventilation was poor and gas fumes filled the site. Dust 
made visibility difficult. The lack of oxygen in the tunnel forced workers to 
inhale more deeply,  taking the inorganic dusts,  especially silica, deep into 
their lungs. 
By the time the tunnel was dug in the early 1930s, the disease silicosis was 
already widely  recognized among miners and experts in occupational dis- 
ease. When silica dust is inhaled into the lungs it creates pathological changes 
that result in loss of pulmonary function, permanent disability, and some- 
times, death. During and after the drilling of the tunnel, reports of disease 
among those itinerant  laborers  who did the work began to circulate;  according 
to some reports, many had died. Because many of the men had left the area 
after becoming sick or after the completion of the work, the story of their 
demise was difficult to substantiate. Rumors circulated in nearby towns, but 
it was impossible to verify the stories of mass burials. Finally, in 1936, spurred 
by press accounts of the disaster, Congress convened hearings to investigate 
what had happened at Gauley Bridge. 
Members of the congressional committee soon  learned that when  men 
working on the tunnel manifested symptoms of sickness, they were forced 
from the worksite. As one witness  told the congressional investigation,  "I 
have seen the sheriff and his men run the workers off their places when they 
were sick and weak, so weak that they could hardly walk" (p. 95). Senator 
Rush D. Holt of West Virginia, after hearing testimony, concluded, "This is 
the most barbaric  example of industrial construction that has ever happened 
in this world. The company well knew what it was going to do to those men. 
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them worse than dumb animals" (p. 78). Union Carbide officials, however, 
consistently denied that conditions in the tunnel had contributed to disease 
and death. "I never saw dust, or at least not enough  to say it was dusty," 
reported the chief engineer at the site. Company officials argued that the risk 
of silicosis could not have been anticipated. 
Cherniack effectively refutes this view, presenting powerful evidence that 
the dangers of silicosis were widely recognized in the mining industry prior 
to the Hawk's Nest project. He concludes that the company's claim that it 
was unaware of the risks in the mine must be considered duplicitous. First, 
the company was fully aware of the high silica content of the mountain; they 
used the silica which they removed. Second, silicosis was already widely rec- 
ognized by the 1930s; further, it was known that adequate ventilation and 
moisture at the drill site could reduce dangerous dust. Finally, Cherniack  pro- 
vides evidence that Union Carbide provided its own engineering staff at the 
site with respirators. 
Given the nature of the story that Cherniack tells, it would be easy to lapse 
into hyperbole and outrage. Yet Cherniack's deliberate and careful account 
makes it all the  more persuasive.  Particularly impressive  is  the range of 
sources and methods that have been engaged in constructing a narrative of 
the events at Gauley Bridge. He demonstrates sensitivity to regional culture, 
uses oral history effectively, as well as employs quantitative epidemiologic 
techniques. 
Since the time of the disaster there has been considerable debate about its 
extent. Union Carbide minimized the problem, while press reports varied. In 
an extensive appendix, Cherniack  uses epidemiologic techniques to estimate 
the actual toll in lives taken to build Hawk's Nest. He argues that it is likely 
that more than 700 men died as a direct result of their work in the tunnel. 
This is an important exercise for two reasons. First, it provides a powerful 
reminder of the extent of the tragedy, the human costs of what might merely 
seem in retrospect a technological achievement.  Second,  from a historical 
viewpoint it suggests the range of social science and quantitative techniques 
that may be employed to bring greater  clarity  to the historical record. In short, 
it provides a more complete understanding of the material reality of danger- 
ous work. 
If Cherniack's book boldly raises the  specter of disregard for workers' 
health, Rosner and Markowitz's collection of essays offers a fuller context for 
the consideration of health and disease within labor history. While Cher- 
niack's study focuses on the epidemiological impact of a specific industrial 
tragedy,  the  Rosner and  Markowitz volume  provides  considerable back- 
ground into the political and social history of the debates about occupational 
safety and risk. These essays center on the complex process  of recognizing and 104  REVIEWS IN AMERICAN  HISTORY  /  MARCH 1989 
regulating workplace risks, as well as the political economy of conflicts re- 
garding the dangers of work. 
With the intensive industrialization of the late nineteenth century, work 
acquired new dangers. As the Hawk's Nest disaster makes clear, among the 
most dangerous worksites were, of course, the mines. Accidents and injuries 
were common. As Alan Derickson demonstrates in his essay on the Coeur 
d'Alene Union Hospitals, workers expressed serious concerns about health 
and organized to provide members with health benefits as early as the late 
nineteenth century. The hospitals that the Union built provided a range of 
services to injured and sick members. A series of mining disasters in the late 
nineteenth century did prompt legislation for mine safety. But well into the 
twentieth century, as the disaster at Gauley Bridge would indicate, such re- 
quirements failed to adequately protect workers from disability and death. 
In the years before the introduction of workmen's compensation, business 
responded to growing public concerns about industrial hazards through pro- 
grams to assist injured workers. Accident relief funds,  jointly financed by 
workers and  employers,  provided  some  assistance,  but as Robert Asher 
shows, these paternalistic  programs often foundered on the conflict between 
attempts to make work safer while simultaneously seeking greater produc- 
tivity at lower costs. Relief associations sought to deflect union activity, as 
well as control liability. 
By the first  years of the twentieth century, the impact of industrial accidents 
had created a compensation crisis. Increasingly workers who suffered serious 
injuries on the job found restitution through litigation. As Anthony Bale ex- 
plains in an insightful essay on compensation, workers and attorneys "raised 
the value of the legal right of action for workplace injuries" (p. 40). Liability 
insurance rates rose, generating a crisis for employers. According to Bale, at 
stake in the crisis was the very nature and meaning of the term "accident." 
Fundamental questions regarding responsibility and accountability for un- 
toward events  were at the center of the debates regarding compensation. 
Who was responsible? Who should bear the cost of injury? What would be 
the process by which accountability would be evaluated. As Bale explains, 
industrial accidents produced a series of "claims" which would then be ne- 
gotiated. The development of workmen's compensation laws eased the early 
twentieth-century crisis in litigation, but larger questions  of worksite risk 
would persist, especially as the nature of occupational dangers changed. 
The growing numbers of nontraumatic injuries  -the  risks of toxins and in- 
organic pollutants leading to systemic and chronic disease -changed  the na- 
ture of the debates about occupational safety by the first decades of the twen- 
tieth century. Rosner and Markowitz, in a series of essays, trace the conflicts 
about the nature of and responsibility for health risks. As the reliability of BRANDT  /  Exploring  the Dangerous  Trades  105 
employers to ensure the health of their workers was increasingly called into 
question,  there was considerable disagreement as to whether issues  of oc- 
cupational safety should remain the province of the unions or be subject to 
governmental regulation. A major labor initiative was the Worker's Health 
Bureau, an organization of progressive-oriented union activists who directed 
research into working conditions during the 1920s. The Bureau conducted a 
series of studies concerning chemical and dust-related diseases, centering at- 
tention on the risks of benzol, carbon dioxide, and silica dust, all important 
industrial hazards. Despite the impressive nature of these studies, the mis- 
givings of the American Federation of Labor eventually led to the demise of 
the Bureau. 
By the 1930s, the federal government sought greater involvement  in oc- 
cupational safety, driven in part by disasters such as that at Gauley Bridge. 
Rosner and Markowitz outline New  Deal policy, emphasizing the conflicts 
between  the Department of Labor under Frances Perkins and the  Public 
Health Service. This rivalry, they suggest, reflected a deep ideological divide 
concerning the role of the government in questions of occupational safety: 
Were industrial risks a labor problem or a health problem? The Public Health 
Service, emphasizing  medical and scientific aspects of industrial hygiene, 
sought to cooperate with industry in research;  the Department of Labor,  how- 
ever, recognized that workplace hazards brought labor and management into 
direct conflict. While the Public Health Service emphasized the medical con- 
dition of individual workers, the Department of Labor tended to look more 
broadly at dangers inherent in the work environment. This division continues 
to be reflected in contemporary approaches to occupational disease. The Na- 
tional Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), an agency of 
the NIH, has essential responsibility for scientific investigation of health haz- 
ards; while the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), a 
division of the Labor Department, has principal responsibility for enforcing 
federal standards in the workplace. 
But as several of the essays in this volume make clear, the process by which 
risks would be indentified and regulated has never followed neat organiza- 
tional charts. To the contrary, they have been subject to intense debate and 
powerful economic forces. Craig Zwerling documents the tortured route by 
which the dangers of beryllium came to be recognized in the production of 
flourescent lights. He documents how the specific commitments of individual 
researchers shaped their scientific conclusions.  Only after considerable re- 
search and debate did it become clear that beryllium could lead to acute and 
chronic respiratory disease, and, in some cases death. 
A particularly  noteworthy essay by William Graebner  underscores the am- 
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shaped the research science as well as public understanding of the dangers 
of leaded gas over a period of decades. In fact, it was only the recognition of 
the environmental risks of lead that confirmed the occupational hazards. 
Other essays in the collection examine a series of occupational hazards whose 
inadequate regulation, despite fairly widespread recognition of risk, led to 
considerable harm among workers; these range from the hazards of radium 
watch dials to brown lung among textile workers. 
Although the essays in this volume are disparate, and, at times, uneven, 
they effectively direct attention to the range of historical problems raised by 
industrial hazards in  the  workplace.  Among  the  significant themes  that 
emerge is the dilemma of demonstrating risk in the modern work environ- 
ment. While the nature of traumatic injury and death led to legislative con- 
trols of certain high risk industries, such as mining, the recognition in the 
twentieth century of "slow risks," low-level but definite risks, and the diffi- 
culty of "proving" the risk of specific toxins, has greatly complicated efforts 
to assure occupational health and safety. Furthermore,  the fundamental com- 
plexity of multiple risk factors made assessment  of responsibility for harm 
even more difficult. Finally, the very politics of "margins of safety" revealed 
underlying values about the nature of class and work under industrial capital. 
The precise ways in which economic and political forces affected the sci- 
entific assessment of dangers reveals a more complex notion of the nature of 
objectivity and science than might be assumed.  In this respect, Rosner and 
Markowitz fail to provide adequate attention to the development  of epide- 
miological and statistical techniques that would make it possible to arrive at 
more powerful conclusions about the nature of industrial and environmental 
hazards. As epidemiological techniques were honed in the years after World 
War II, the powerful conflicts between  significant economic interests and 
workers' health were brought into stark relief despite the fact that companies 
often refused to permit access to critical data. The very concept of risk, as 
these essays indicate, has been socially elastic. 
As both these books demonstrate, even the recognition of danger did not 
lead to clear  and explicit social policies. Implicit  in the conflicts over industrial 
risks have been a series of complex questions and powerful vested interests 
eager to obscure the nature of these risks. What has been the nature of cor- 
porate responsibility for the health of workers? What types of risks have been 
tolerated and what have not? Are disputes concerning health risks best left 
at the bargaining table or are they more appropriately the province of gov- 
ernmental regulation?  And finally, what is the manner in which such disputes 
have been studied and resolved; what is the relationship of scientific inves- 
tigation of risk to the formulation of social policy? 
These are difficult  but important questions that will require further system- BRANDT  /  Exploring  the Dangerous  Trades  107 
atic historical research. But these two books contribute significantly to our 
understanding of the nature of work in modern industrial America and its 
powerful impact on human health and disease.  They demonstrate the im- 
portance of health as a preeminent marker of social change and economic 
conflict. The authors argue that if we are to understand the nature of indus- 
trial work in the twentieth century, we must be sensitive to the varied indi- 
cators of health and disease. They make abundantly clear the valuable his- 
torical insights that may accrue from "exploring the dangerous trades." 
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